






Expansionism and the 
Pacific
Pacific islands have long figured as idylls – 
a myth that conceals a history of Western 
entanglement ranging from voyages of 
discovery, competition for trade routes, and 
colonial expansion, to annexation, commer-
cial exploitation, militarisation, population 
displacement, and dozens of nuclear weapons 
tests (as recently as 1996).
As early as the 16th century, Western 
encounters with Pacific peoples were marked 
by cultural misunderstandings and frequent 
violence, as is well documented in both 
Antonio Pigafetta’s account of Magellan’s 
major exploring voyage (1521) and Pedro 
Fernández de Quirós’s journal relat-
ing Mendaña’s failed attempt to colonise 
the Solomons (1595). By the 18th century, 
European voyages of exploration and scien-
tific documentation, with their vivid accounts, 
established the South Seas both as a real site 
ripe for economic and territorial expansion, 
and an ideal space suited to the projection of 
desires for escape, spatial mastery, and sensual 
indulgence. 
By the 1770s, the US had started to bring 
its free-market values to the Pacific, when 
ships from the East Coast sailed around Cape 
Horn, heading for the trans-oceanic Chinese 
trade routes laid down by Spain, France, and 
Britain. David N. Leff notes that the American 
flag first reached China in 1784, establish-
ing a strategic goal that would dominate US–
Pacific relations (Leff 1940: 3). Spurred on by 
an expansionism born in the 18th century and 
soon harnessed to the 19th-century ideology 
of manifest destiny, the roots of the ‘American 
Pacific’ were grounded in the interconnected 
forces of real politics and mythic invention.
One of first colonising gestures made 
by the recently decolonised US nation took 
place in 1791, when Joseph Ingraham of 
the Hope claimed the northern islands of 
the Marquesas, naming them after lumi-
naries of the US Enlightenment such as 
Franklin, Adams, and Hancock. Just three 
weeks later, Etienne Marchand reclaimed all 
of the Marquesas for France. Significantly, 
the Marquesas would become the site of the 
first major US military conflict in the Pacific, 
when Captain David Porter – sometimes 
called ‘the first American imperialist’ (Rowe 
2000: 83) – stopped at Taiohae harbour in 
Nukuhiva to refit his ship the Essex during 
the War of 1812. The 1812 war, as Thomas 
Walter Herbert notes, evinced a desire of the 
US to be recognised as a legitimate state, one 
of the ‘community of nations’ (Herbert 1980: 
79), as Porter’s actions in the Marquesas 
seem to bear out. Following a breakdown of 
agreements with local people, Porter and his 
men became embroiled in ongoing conflicts 
between the Tei‘i, Hapa‘a, and Taipi peoples, 
and proceeded to raid Taipivai, burning whole 
villages and killing many of what Porter later 
described as its ‘unhappy and heroic people’ 
(Porter 1822: 105). Porter formally took pos-
session of the island, demanding that its peo-
ple swear allegiance to the American flag. His 
subsequent ‘Declaration of Conquest’ indi-
cates the paternalism of a US Enlightenment 
vision: 
Our rights to this island being founded 
on priority of discovery, conquest, and 
possession, cannot be disputed. But the 
natives, to secure themselves that friendly 
protection which their defenseless situ-
ation so much required, have requested 
to be admitted into the great American 
family, whose pure republican policy 
approaches so near their own. (79)
The US government never ratified Porter’s 
occupation, and 30 years later the French 
again claimed the island group. Still, Porter’s 
‘Typee War’ marked the fierce impact of haole 
(outsiders) on Pacific locales, and it fasci-
nated and haunted travellers in Polynesia 
(such as Herman Melville and Paul Gauguin) 
for years to come. 
In spite of Porter’s failures, his published 
account, along with others that appeared 
around the same time (the German-Russian 
circumnavigator Adam J. von Krusenstern’s 
Voyage round the World in the Years 1803 … 1806 
appeared in English in 1813, and his chief 
scientist, Georg H. von Langsdorff, pub-
lished Voyages and Travels in Various Parts of the 
World in English in 1813–14, with a US edi-
tion in 1817) helped reinforce a notion that 
Pacific islands could serve US interests. 
However, while accounts such as Porter’s 
painted a relatively positive portrait of Pacific 
cultures and stressed connections between 
the Marquesas and the ‘great American fam-

























































cha70.indd   1 05-10-2015   14:40:03






2 United States Expansionism and the Pacific
of Pacific life that undermined any sense of 
familial inclusion. Missionary reports writ-
ten under the influence of Calvinist doctrine 
commonly figured Pacific islanders as cruel, 
violent, and needing religious conversion. 
Publications that backed missionary societies 
(such as the Massachusetts Baptist Missionary 
Magazine and Niles Weekly Register) were dedi-
cated to ‘evangelizing the heathen’, and they 
portrayed groups such as the Maoris and 
Society Islanders as indulging in warfare, 
orgies, cannibalism, and infanticide. These 
‘hard primitivist’ notions of barbaric savagery 
thus accompanied, and in many ways played 
off, ‘soft primitivist’ concepts of noble sav-
ages inherited from European thinkers such 
as Jean-Jacques Rousseau; together they are 
emblematic of an underlying duality that has 
persisted in US representations of the Pacific.
Charles Wilkes’s US naval expedition of 
1838–42 further manifested this contradic-
tory stance: purporting to be objective and 
scientific, Wilkes would become better known 
for his strong-arm military tactics (much like 
Porter’s before him) than for his contributions 
to enlightened American progress. During 
an aggressive campaign in Fiji on Malolo, the 
villages of Arro (now Yaro) and Sualib were 
burned to the ground as revenge for the killing 
of two officers in the midst of a trading dis-
pute. At Wilkes’s command, injured survivors 
crawled on their hands and knees, begging 
for his pardon. One of Wilkes’s crew, Charles 
Erskine, was so stunned by the events that he 
wrote: ‘perhaps I may be pardoned for think-
ing it would have been better if the islands had 
never been discovered by Europeans; not that 
Christianity is a failure, but that our [Western] 
civilization is’ (quoted in Perry 1994: 52–53).
The political and commercial contours of 
the ‘American Pacific’ era began to emerge 
with the help of the British-Chinese Opium 
War and the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. The 
US found itself in a disadvantaged position 
regarding Pacific trade routes due to con-
cessions granted to Britain, but lobbied for 
extended rights and therefore achieved a 
stake in the Pacific on a par with European 
powers. Soon after, the signing of the Oregon 
Treaty in 1846 signalled the coming of the 
‘American Pacific empire’, when US free-
market liberalism would supplant established 
European powers (Dudden 1994: xix). In 
1850, California was declared the 31st state in 
the Union, and the vaunted ideology of mani-
fest destiny effectively became a geopolitical 
reality. As the balance of power shifted west, 
California became central to Pacific trade, with 
the west coast now at the heart of ‘the global 
space economy of capitalism that would con-
tinue for the next century and a half ’ (Soja 
1989: 190). Closely linked to these economic 
shifts was the growth of US whaling routes, 
which Porter had staunchly defended. By mid-
century, the importance of whaling was mani-
fested in the US presence and investment in 
Hawai‘i: the commercial plantation periphery 
to the emerging global centrality of the US.
The work of the literary figure perhaps most 
closely associated with the whaling industry, 
Melville, offers insights into some of the anxi-
eties raised by US expansionism. Melville’s 
Typee (1846) gestures towards anti-interven-
tionism, and questions fundamental assump-
tions behind Western cultural hierarchies:
The enormities perpetrated in the South 
Seas upon some of the inoffensive islanders 
well nigh pass belief. … We breathe noth-
ing but vengeance, and equip armed ves-
sels to traverse thousands of miles of ocean 
in order to execute summary punishment 
on the offenders. On arriving at their des-
tination, they burn, slaughter, and destroy, 
according to the tenor of written instruc-
tions, and sailing away from the scene of 
devastation, call upon all Christendom to 
applaud their courage and their justice. 
How often is the term ‘savages’ incorrectly 
applied! (Melville 1996/1846: 27)
Melville’s ironic reversals threaten to turn 
the logic of the imperial ‘civilising mission’ 
on its head. By the time of writing Moby-Dick 
(1851), Melville had outlined an even clearer 
sense that the growth of the American Pacific 
would engender not just tactical violence, 
but ongoing commercialism, culminating 
in an Oceanic domination where ‘new built 
California towns, but yesterday planted by 
the recentest race of men’ would be directly 
linked to ‘low-lying, endless, unknown 
Archipelagoes, and impenetrable Japans’ via 
islands overrun by the demands of US mar-
kets (Melville 1994/1851: 456).
Driven by market forces, US expansion 
after the 1850s was largely linked to demands 
for guano, a highly profitable commodity 
used as fertiliser. With the ‘Guano Wars’ and 
Guano Act of 1856, Washington’s leaders 
declared the legality of claiming territory in 
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 United States Expansionism and the Pacific 3
Whenever any citizen of the United States 
discovers a deposit of guano on any island, 
rock, or key, not within the lawful juris-
diction of any other Government, and 
not occupied by the citizens of any other 
Government, and takes peaceable posses-
sion thereof, and occupies the same, such 
island, rock, or key may, at the discretion 
of the President, be considered as apper-
taining to the United States. (quoted in 
Leff 1940: 7–8)
Unincorporated territories such as Baker, 
Jarvis, Nikumaroro (Gardner), Fakaofo 
(Bowditch), and Howland islands, along with 
Kingman Reef and the Kalama (Johnston) 
Atoll, were taken under this provision. At the 
same time, copra (dried coconut for produc-
ing oil) was emerging as the primary industry 
in the region, with Germany holding the great-
est stake. Increasing commercial competition 
over the coming decades had substantial effects 
on Pacific and migrant labourers, with black-
birding (kidnapping indigenous peoples into 
slave labour) increasing through the 1860s.
As the commercial stakes got higher, a 
more clearly defined agenda emerged under 
Abraham Lincoln’s secretary of state William 
Henry Seward, who envisioned the Pacific as 
central to the quest to develop a US ‘empire’ 
that could gain control of world markets. 
Seward argued that the US could achieve 
global power through commercial competi-
tion, ‘depending not on armies nor even on 
wealth, but directly on invention and industry’ 
(quoted in Paolino 1973: 4). Though Seward’s 
wider ambitions were never realised during 
his lifetime, shortly after the end of the Civil 
War, in 1867, he was responsible for bringing 
both Alaska and the Midway Islands under US 
control.
It has often been argued that as late as the 
1880s, Washington was still exhibiting an 
ambivalent attitude towards undertaking 
extensive expansion in the Pacific. The US 
stake could be seen as meagre compared to 
European colonial networks’, and its inter-
ests were largely limited to those of private 
shippers and traders. Donald Johnson and 
Gary Dean Best note that in the 1860s, Apia, 
Lauthala, Suva, and Papeete had US consu-
lar representatives, but even these numbers 
began to dwindle as France, Britain, and 
later Germany assumed control of various 
island groups. Though this diminished pres-
ence might be attributed more to the recovery 
period after the Civil War and the economic 
crash of 1873, rather than to a lack of official 
interest, Johnson and Best (1995: 123) argue 
that ‘there simply was no American colo-
nial policy in the 1870s and 1880s, either in 
Congress or in the executive branch, although 
occasionally voices might be raised in favor of 
one or another expansive move’.
A closer look, however, indicates that the 
US was hardly turning away from Pacific 
speculation but instead shifting focus onto 
a small number of strategic island sites. For 
Walter LaFeber, the years 1850–89 can be 
viewed as the ‘roots of empire’, a period of 
preparation for the imperial acquisitions of 
the 1890s (LaFeber 1998/1963: 55). US repre-
sentatives successfully negotiated in 1872 for 
the use of the harbour at Pago Pago, and the 
close involvement of Albert B. Steinberger 
(a self-styled ‘special agent’ of the US State 
Department who came to see himself as the 
future ‘arch-manipulator’ of Samoan affairs) 
in the formation of a Samoan government 
in 1875 assured ongoing US influence in the 
midst of subsequent governmental power 
shifts (Davidson 1967: 60). By 1878, US 
interests were officially entangled in Samoa, 
and by the late 1880s the secretary of state, 
Thomas Bayard, was explicitly linking the US 
interest in Samoa to the strategic construc-
tion of a canal across Central America. It is 
not really possible, therefore, to separate the 
interconnected US designs on the Pacific, 
Latin America, and the Caribbean. During 
this period, advocates of ‘preventive imperi-
alism’ urged for the acquisition of territories 
that were in danger of being taken by other 
nations, while illicit activities such as black-
birding continued unabated. 
Historians have contested the once com-
monly held notion that US imperial expan-
sion during the 1890s should be seen as an 
aberration amid predominantly isolationist 
policies. Indeed, the scale of the events that 
took place over an 18-month period between 
1898 and 1899 (when the US took posses-
sion of Hawai‘i, the eastern islands of Samoa, 
Wake Island, Guam, the Philippines, Puerto 
Rico, and Cuba, the latter as an occupied 
country and protectorate) suggests that these 
actions were hardly isolated or anomalous. In 
Hawai‘i, Queen Liliuokalani was overthrown 
in 1893 by American forces as a direct result 
of increasing commercial exploitation of 
the sugar industry, but the act was not a fait 
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4 United States Expansionism and the Pacific
the Blount Report of July 1893, found that 
US forces had conspired against the mon-
archy, and Cleveland opposed annexation 
due to the islanders’ resistance. The sub-
sequent Morgan Report of 1894, however, 
reversed Blount’s conclusions and refused 
Liliuokalani’s return to power, leading to an 
interim colonial administration headed by an 
open enemy of Hawai‘ian self-rule, Sanford B. 
Dole. President William McKinley, who took 
office in 1897, also favoured annexation. In 
1898, he succeeded, arguing: ‘we need Hawaii 
just as much and a good deal more than we 
did California. It is manifest destiny’ (quoted 
in Morgan 2003: 225).
A member of the US Civil Service Commission, 
John R. Procter, summed up the momentous 
events: 
The year 1898 will be one of the epoch-
marking years in the history of the United 
States. In this year is to be decided the 
great question of whether this country is 
to continue in its policy of political isola-
tion, or is to take its rightful place among 
the great World-Powers, and assume the 
unselfish obligations and responsibilities 
demanded by the enlightened civilizations 
of the age. (quoted in Welch 1972: 21)
Procter invoked a ‘New Imperialism’ rising 
from the ashes of European imperialism, 
and the Pacific was seen as the natural exten-
sion of manifest destiny. For pro-imperialists 
such as Procter, the issue was not merely 
political, but also moral and even explicitly 
racial. Procter’s invocation of battles in the 
Philippines praises the systems developed by 
‘Teutonic ancestors’, finding them regener-
ated in US beliefs and practices: ‘from the 
blood of our heroes, shed at Santiago and 
Manila, there shall arise a New Imperialism, 
replacing the waning Imperialism of Old 
Rome; an Imperialism destined to carry 
world-wide the principles of Anglo-Saxon 
peace and justice, liberty and law’ (quoted 
in Welch 1972: 26). Indeed, as Peter Hulme 
argues, ‘as the nineteenth century progressed, 
US Americanism increasingly became an ide-
ology based on the supposed moral and polit-
ical superiority of the Anglo-Saxon peoples’ 
(Hulme 2012: 59), a concept reinforced in a 
closely related notion of ‘English-speaking 
peoples’. This privileged category was pro-
moted in the writings of Teddy Roosevelt (the 
first volume of his The Winning of the West is 
titled ‘The Spread of the English-Speaking 
Peoples’) and later persisted in prominent 
works such as Winston Churchill’s A History of 
the English-Speaking Peoples.
The motives behind expansionism were 
summed up by McKinley: ‘there was noth-
ing left for us to do but to take them all and 
to educate the Filipinos and uplift and civilize 
and Christianize them, and by God’s grace 
do the very best we could by them as fellow-
men for whom Christ also died’ (quoted in 
Dudden 1994: 84). With these objectives, the 
president placed what Kipling had ironically 
labelled the ‘white man’s burden’ firmly into 
US hands, perpetuating and extending estab-
lished European colonial networks. Vincent 
Rafael reminds us that the Philippines mis-
sion was characterised by McKinley’s policy 
of ‘benevolent assimilation’, which incorpo-
rated a nostalgic vision of manifest destiny 
while at the same time patronising Filipinos 
as the colonial children of the US, separat-
ing out the good ones from those labelled 
‘insurgents’ (Rafael 2000: 21–22). More 
than 200,000 Filipinos (perhaps as many as 
a million) were killed during the ensuing 
Philippine-American war. 
Often represented as a benevolent mis-
sion, US expansionism was underpinned 
by political and economic motives. For 
example, the watershed year of 1898 would 
see the founding of the American Asiatic 
Association, with its mission of working to 
‘foster and safeguard American trade and 
commercial interests’ (i.e. to lobby to pro-
tect US trade routes across the Pacific) and to 
‘co-operate with religious, educational, and 
philanthropic agencies designed to remove 
existing obstacles to the peaceful progress 
and wellbeing of Asiatic peoples’ (American 
Asiatic Association 1925: 709). In 1899, the 
Association’s secretary pushed aside pre-
vailing messages about the ‘civilising mis-
sion’ and offered a blunter analysis of the 
Philippines’ annexation: ‘had we no interests 
in China’, he noted, ‘the possession of the 
Philippines would be meaningless’ (quoted in 
LaFeber 1998/1963: 410).
There were, nonetheless, open concerns 
regarding the annexations of 1898–99. The 
Philippines conflict, for example, led anti-
imperialists such as William James to argue 
that any possibility of the US retaining a 
moral advantage in international politics 
was lost: ‘now (having puked up our ancient 
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 United States Expansionism and the Pacific 5
and turned pirate like the rest) we are in the 
chain of international hatreds, and every atom 
of our moral prestige lost forever’. For James, 
the debate over expansion in the Pacific was 
‘surely our second slavery question’ (James 
1972/1900: 108–109), pointedly collapsing the 
presumed gap between far-flung imperialist 
aggressions and domestic racial policies by 
highlighting continuities between ‘external’ 
and ‘internal’ (or ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’) 
subjugations.
Advocates for expansion nonetheless were 
gaining the upper hand in the war of rheto-
ric, arguing that what once had appeared to 
be limitless space for advancement within US 
borders was filling up. The transcontinen-
tal railroad, completed in 1869, had shrunk 
spatial perceptions of the continent dra-
matically, reducing the travelling time from 
the East Coast to California from an ardu-
ous journey of months to one that could be 
done in under a week. Furthermore, by 1890, 
the US Census Bureau would announce that 
the western frontier had officially closed. A 
range of scholarly and literary works began to 
lament the loss of free land, indicating that a 
pervasive ‘frontier crisis’ had entered US con-
sciousness (Wrobel 1993: 29). At the same 
time, rapid industrial expansion contributed 
to ‘boom and bust’ economics: depression 
struck in 1873–78 and 1882–86, and would 
return with force in 1893, lasting through 
1897. Rekindling the visionary thinking of 
empire-builders like Seward, historian Hubert 
Howe Bancroft laid out plans for escaping 
what appeared an increasingly urbanised and 
unstable American continent by reinvigorat-
ing manifest destiny across ‘the new Pacific’:
The year 1898 was one of bewildering 
changes … Almost since yesterday, from 
the modest attitude of quiet industry the 
United States assumes the position of a 
world power, and enters, armed and alert, 
the arena of international rivalry as a colo-
nizing force, with a willingness to accept 
the labour and responsibilities thence 
arising. (Bancroft 1912: 12–13)
Bancroft then envisions the new America: 
‘Thus the old America passes away; behold a 
new America appears, and her face is toward 
the Pacific!’ (ibid.)
Yet the shift of US military and com-
mercial power towards the Pacific was not 
merely the logical extension of the westward 
march of empire; it can be seen as part of 
the socio-spatial dynamics that Rob Wilson 
(drawing on Edward Soja) has called ‘periph-
eralization’, where the spatial mastery and 
centralisation of one area becomes yoked 
to the commodification and distribution of 
power over peripheral areas. Hence Pacific 
islands like Hawai‘i become linked as plan-
tation and tourist resources to the growth 
of California as part of a closely integrated 
‘global dynamic’ (Wilson 2000: 94). This 
period further encompassed the rise of what 
Emily Rosenberg calls the ideology of liberal-
developmentalism in US diplomatic policy: 
the adaptation of free-market enterprise 
as a fundamental principle for all nations, 
coupled with the growing acceptance of 
government intervention to protect private 
enterprise and speculation abroad. This ide-
ology was aligning itself with both religious 
and secular senses of the US ‘mission’ over-
seas: the Christianisation of non-Christians 
through radical conversion and the bringing 
of technological and professional know-how, 
or ‘progress’, to ‘underdeveloped’ peoples 
around the globe (Rosenberg 1982: 7–9).
By the start of the 20th century, New World 
powers such as Australia, New Zealand, and 
Japan, like the US, were jockeying for position 
in the Pacific amidst established European 
colonial powers. It was thus hardly surpris-
ing when, in 1907, a rumour circulated that 
the US wanted to buy Tahiti from France for 
$5 million, presaging the ‘dollar diplomacy’ 
that would shortly hold sway under William 
Howard Taft’s Administration. With the 
Panama Canal’s completion in 1914 (after 
Panama, backed by the US warship Nashville, 
declared its independence from Colombia 
in early 1904), the US gained an enormous 
advantage in the global commercial arena. 
Powers such as France (their own canal pro-
ject having foundered) had long held that 
the canal was the lynchpin to gaining domi-
nance over Pacific trade routes. The French 
journal Océanie française stated: ‘The Panama 
Canal is not only an instrument of economic 
conquest. The Panama Canal will also create 
incalculable consequences. It will permit an 
active reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, 
altered from its original intent now for the 
sole profit of the Americans’ (quoted in 
Aldrich 1990: 261). The French clearly still felt 
the sting of the Monroe Doctrine’s invocation 
which, starting in 1842, had prevented inter-
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6 United States Expansionism and the Pacific
US investment abroad, both economic and 
psychic, proceeded apace: between 1897 and 
1914 (before the First World War forced a tem-
porary slowdown), US direct investments in 
overseas companies increased fourfold, while 
the immense popularity of missionary socie-
ties like the YMCA, ‘rushing to convert the 
world to American-style Christianity within 
their lifetimes’, continued to gain ground 
(Rosenberg 1982: 28). When the War came, 
it did not spare the Pacific: in 1914, Australian 
troops fought German and Melanesian sol-
diers in New Guinea, while soon after, a 
German ship bombarded Tahiti, rather than 
Samoa, due to the ‘high esteem’ German naval 
commanders held for its population (Hiery 
2012: 23–27). The Pacific, the strategic cross-
roads of competing powers, would in just 
over 20 years’ time end up as a theatre of 
war, where the simmering imperial conflicts 
would be fully acted out.
Robert Aldrich refers to the period between 
the World Wars as the apogee of colonial 
power in the Pacific: a time when the idea of 
colonialism reached its zenith, when expan-
sionist lobbyists and new modes of techni-
cal reproduction were disseminating images 
of colonial ideology more widely than ever 
before (Aldrich 1990: 273). But tensions were 
visible: the policies of New Zealand admin-
istrator Brigadier General George Spafford 
Richardson in Samoa initiated the rise of the 
anti-colonial movement the Mau (Samoan 
for holding fast), with violent skirmishes 
between New Zealand police and Mau pro-
testors in the late 1920s. The Mau movement 
was also active in American Samoa, which 
was still under US Navy rule (Margaret Mead, 
famously, lived in a Naval dispensary with an 
American family while researching Coming of 
Age in Samoa [1928]). Under US rule, Samoans 
still faced the prohibition of interracial mar-
riage, and there were disputes relating to pay 
for workers in the copra trade and Samoan 
police guard. In 1929, in response to direct 
Samoan pressures, the US government 
changed the status of the territory from that 
of an ‘illegal’ to a ‘legal’ colony (Droessler 
2013: 62).
As the Great Depression hit, US expansion-
ism appeared to slow in terms of markets 
and territorial acquisitions, but at the same 
time tourism was helping to propagate the 
Pacific idyll in the popular imagination: by the 
1930s, unprecedented numbers were embark-
ing on luxury ships for ‘round the world’ 
cruises. Pacific crossings included stopovers 
at ports that had long underpinned imperial 
trade networks. The establishment of Matson 
Lines’ famous ‘white ships’ (the S.S. Malola 
was launched in 1927 and the S.S. Mariposa 
in 1931) linked the east and west coasts of the 
US, via the Panama Canal, to Hawai‘i, Samoa, 
Fiji, New Zealand, and Australia, reflecting 
the escalation of mass tourism and a sub-
stantial increase in tourist traffic through 
Pacific ports (the ‘white ships’ perhaps echo-
ing Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet 
of battleships, also painted white, sent to cir-
cumnavigate the globe in 1907 in a show of 
US military prowess). At the same time, com-
mercial air travel was becoming a feature of 
modern life: in 1935, Pan American Airlines 
began services between San Francisco and 
Manila, with the China Clipper airplane becom-
ing a symbol of national pride.
US military expansion also continued. 
The Panama Canal was widened in the mid-
1930s to accommodate larger warships, and 
military installations on key sites such as 
Samoa were further developed, with the con-
struction of a naval airbase and advanced 
fortifications at Pago Pago harbour in 1940. 
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor 
on 7 December 1941, the US immediately 
entered the Second World War; within days, 
thousands were flooding army recruitment 
stations to enlist for war, reflecting the pow-
erful military, territorial, and psychic roles 
that Pacific island territories were playing in 
US life. Strategic planning in the run-up to 
war would prove enormously beneficial, when 
island bases served as supply sites and stag-
ing grounds for years of fierce air, sea, and 
land battles (a period of total militarisation 
of the ‘Pacific theater’ of war) as the US and 
its allies battled Japan for Pacific mastery. As 
Rob Wilson notes, the idea of the ‘American 
Pacific’ began to take root as early as imperi-
alist struggles for Samoa and Hawai‘i during 
the late 19th century, but it was realised only 
after these Second World War battles, when 
the US defeated Japan and took control via 
‘strategic trust’ in Micronesia and other terri-
tories of interest (Wilson 2000: 106).
Immediately following the war, the psy-
chic hegemony of the American Pacific was 
so complete that James Michener’s Tales of 
the South Pacific (1947) could represent the 
Pacific’s ‘trivial islands’ as essentially nos-
talgic playgrounds for American soldiers 
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 United States Expansionism and the Pacific 7
Lyons 2006: 28). The new ‘American Pacific’ 
became the sum of a US vision won through 
commerce, missionary work, and ultimately 
military conflict on an unprecedented scale. 
As constructed after the post-war seizing of 
territories from Japan, it came to include the 
Marshall Islands, Belau, the Federated States 
of Micronesia, the Northern Marianas, Guam, 
and American Samoa. As of 1990, there were 
nearly 300,000 US military personnel based in 
the ‘Pacific theater’, with the Department of 
Defense spending roughly $16.8 billion (US) 
to support its presence there (United States 
Government Accountability Office 1991). 
This military presence remains the war’s 
most profound and controversial legacy, with 
whole islands having been used as test sites 
for nuclear arms, and others (such as Kalama 
Atoll) becoming military dumps for chemi-
cal weapons. At least 66 nuclear tests were 
conducted in the Bikini Atolls, held under 
the unprecedented legal arrangement of a 
‘strategic trusteeship’. Moved to make way 
for ‘Operation Crossroads’, the first detona-
tion of a nuclear device since the bombing of 
Nagasaki, the people of Bikini would experi-
ence a series of displacements that enacted 
severe physical and emotional hardships. They 
were moved to Rongerik Atoll, where mass 
starvation ensued, then to Kwajalein Atoll, liv-
ing in tents alongside a military airstrip, and 
then finally to Kili Island, a tiny outpost with-
out a lagoon for fishing, hence inadequate for 
supplying food. The majority remain there due 
to residual nuclear contamination.
The story of the Bikini islanders exempli-
fies the economic dependency, environmental 
degradation, and military dominance that still 
mark the US presence in the Pacific. In spite 
of their cultural richness, economic hard-
ship (unemployment in American Samoa 
approaches 30 per cent) in various territories 
has led to an unusually high proportion of 
people seeking work in the US armed forces, 
with disproportionately high casualties in 
recent wars as a result (American Samoa has 
its own military recruiting station in Utulei). 
In unincorporated territories such as American 
Samoa and Guam, there are ongoing calls 
for political representation with full US vot-
ing rights, as well as movements calling for 
greater political autonomy, and independence. 
Saleable terms such as the ‘Pacific Rim’ 
and transnational ‘Asia-Pacific’ markets 
have begun to absorb and supplant concepts 
such as the American Pacific. Fijian writer 
Subramani (1985) has argued that even a 
seemingly monolithic term like ‘American 
Pacific’ has nonetheless long formed part 
of a broader, multicentred Pacific region 
that speaks to and has confronted a range 
of imperial centres. Works such as Vanessa 
Warheit’s and Amy Robinson’s film (and 
internet blog) The Insular Empire (2010), made 
in the Marianas, has addressed related issues 
of the paradoxes of presumed isolation versus 
actual transnational and transcultural interac-
tions, charting everyday life in the still largely 
ignored spaces of empire. Barack Obama, 
raised in Hawai‘i and hence, as Holger 
Droessler puts it, ‘America’s first Pacific 
President’, declared in a speech to Japanese 
leaders in November 2009 that the United 
States ‘is a nation of the Pacific; Asia and the 
Pacific are not separated by this great ocean, 
we are bound by it’. The centrality of Asia to 
US foreign policy has thus led to the blurring 
and renewal of two distinctly 20th-century 
terms (‘American Pacific’ and the ‘American 
Century’), with the 21st century being labelled 
as ‘America’s Pacific Century’.
Jeffrey Geiger 
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